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Kentucky Employees' Wage
Liens: A Sneak Attack on
Creditors, but Beware of
the Bankruptcy Trustee
BY RICHARD H. NowKA*
AND JEFF S. TAYLOR**
INTRODUCTION
In Kentucky, employees who have not been paid by a business have
been granted a statutory lien on the business' property from the earliest
statutory codifications of Kentucky law.' Examining the cases wherein
a party claimed the lien shows that most of the legal activity involving
the lien occurred in the early to mid 1900s. In fact, there does not appear
to be a published case involving the employees' lien since the 1940s. Due
to the steady number of businesses closing their doors,2 it may be time
to dust off the lien and put it to work.
One may protest that with businesses mortgaging their real property
and granting security interests in their personal property there is little left
for the lien to encumber. Businesses often secure borrowings with their
assets3 which is the precise reason why employees need to arm them-
selves with the lien. Why? Because the reasonable and logical interpreta-
tion of the lien statute should be that the lien has priority over such
encumbrances, even when the encumbrances antedate the lien.
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S. 1973, Wayne State College; J.D.
1976, Creighton University.
** Member of the Kentucky Bar. B.S. 1975, Murray State University; M.P.A. 1976,
Memphis State University; J.D. 1982, University of Louisville.
' The Kentucky legislature enacted the lien statute on March 20, 1876. The earliest
codification of the statute occurred in 1887. KY. GEN. STAT. ch. 70, art. III (Bullitt &
Feland 1887).
2 David N. Ravin, Gettingthe "Professionals "to Chip In, N.J. L.J., Jan. 17, 1994,
at 5 (discussing the increase in bankruptcy filings).
' SeeAimfor the Right Environment, NATION'S Bus., Mar. 1995, at 52 (discussing
an example in which a business borrowed against its assets to create liquidity).
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Part I of this Article explores the lien and cases interpreting it.4 Next,
part II presents an analysis of the priority of the lien against the priority
of a Uniform Commercial Code Article Nine security interest in the
personal property of the business.5 Finally, part I examines the lien as
it enters the period where the business has filed a petition in bankruptcy.6
This Article concludes that the Kentucky employees' lien is a powerful
tool, superior to an Article Nine security interest, and unavoidable by a
bankruptcy trustee in most situations.7
I. SCOPE OF TE LEN
Section 376.150 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes grants employees
a lien upon their employer's property and effects, which are involved in
the business, whether or not the business is incorporated, when the
property or effects are assigned for the benefit of or distributed among
creditors.8 Should the company suspend, sell, or transfer its business, or
if business is stopped or suspended as a result of its property being
attached or levied upon, the employees' lien also attaches.' Many events
activate the employees' lien: the assignment of business property for the
benefit of creditors; the voluntary or involuntary distribution of business
property; suspension, sale, or transfer of the business; and attachment or
execution upon business property so that the business is stopped or
4 See infra notes 8-52 and accompanying text.
S See infra notes 53-127 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 128-227 and accompanying text.
7 See infra p. 348.
8 Section 376.150 states:
(1) When the property or effects of any mine, railroad or canal, or other public
improvement company, or of any rolling mill, foundry or other manufacturing
establishment, or of any other business, whether incorporated or not, are
assigned for the benefit of, or are to be distributed among creditors, whether by
operation of law or by its own act, the employes of the owner or operator of the
business shall have a lien upon the property and effects which have been
involved in the business and upon the accessoriesconnected therewith, including
any interest in real property used in carrying on the business.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.150(1) (Baldwin 1994).
9 When any company or establishment referred to in [Kentucky Revised
Statutes §] 376.150 suspends, sells or transfers its business, or when the
property or effects engaged in the business are taken in attachment or execution
so that the business is stopped or suspended, a lien shall attach as provided in
[Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated §] 376.150 and may be enforced by
proceedings in equity.
Id. § 376.180.
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suspended." While some of these events involve legal action, others
have no connection with the law. For instance, filing a federal bankrupt-
cy petition falls within the event "property ... assigned for the benefit
of... creditors" and activates the legal process of the federal bankruptcy
code." Simply closing the doors and walking away from the business
comes within the event "suspensionof a business" and also triggers the
lien without any legal action. 2
Given the breadth of events that activate the lien, it is no surprise that
Kentucky courts have taken an expansive view of the situations that will
trigger the lien. In Gugenheim v. Watkins,"3 the judgment by the circuit
court ordered sale of all the company's property to satisfy the company's
debts. 4 The court of appeals agreed with the conclusion of the chancel-
lor that the order had caused the "company's affairs... to be distributed
among its creditors ..... thus activating the lien. 5
The lien is given to the "employes of the owner or operator of the
business ... .'" However, neither the "president or other chief officer,
nor any director or stockholder of any such company shall be deemed an
employe within the meaning of [section] 376.150 [of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes]."' 7 Courts have refused to extend the lien to indepen-
dent contractors doing business with the owner or operator of the
business.'
The employees' entitlement under the lien is designated by section
376.160 of Kentucky Revised Statutes as "for the whole amount due the
employes ... .""9 That section also addresses the priority of the lien and
speaks in terms of "wages." '2 However, limiting the lien to wages does
not seem to include "the whole amount due"' unless the term wages is
'old. §§ 376.150, .180.
" Id. § 376.150.
121d. § 376.180.
11 181 S.W. 357 (Ky. 1916).
14Id. at 358-59.
15Id. at 359.
16 KY. RV. STAT. ANN. § 376.150(1) (Baldwin 1994).
171d. § 376.160; Trust Co. of Am. v. Casey, 115 S.W. 780, 782 (Ky. 1909) (holding
a director of a company not entitled to a superior lien on property of an insolvent
corporation).
11 Southern Coal Co. v. Martin's Fork Coal Co., 151 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Ky. 1940)
(holding that an independent contractor is not entitled to a labor lien); Katz v. Scott, 17
S.W.2d 1024, 1027 (Ky. 1929) (stating that where statute does not clearly include
independent contractors, they cannot take advantage of the lien).
19 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).20 Id.
21 Id.
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given an expansive reading. For example, under the employee's contract
with the business, the employee might be due vacation pay or medical
reimbursement. Such amounts should be included in "the whole amount
due the employes .... ."' Chapter 337 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, entitled "Wages and Hours," defines wages, for the purposes of
that chapter, as follows:
"Wages" include any compensation due to an employee by reason of his
employment, such compensationto include salaries, commissions, vested
vacation pay, overtime pay, severance or dismissal pay, earned
bonuses, and any other similar advantages agreed upon by the employer
and the employee or provided to employees as an established policy
23
Adoption of that definition as a statement of the employees' lien
entitlement comports with the statute's words: "the whole amount due the
employes . . ,24
The statute defines the broad boundaries of the property encumbered
by the lien. Employees are given a lien "upon the property and effects
which have been involved in the business and upon the accessories
connected therewith .... ,25 The phrase "property and effects 26
should encompass such items as equipment, supplies, raw materials, work
in progress, and inventory.27 A court has even held that intangible
property is property "involved in the business." In Fels v George
Lueders & Co., the lienholders asserted their liens against certain
accounts receivable of the business which had been assigned before the
business' bankruptcy.28 The assignee argued that, due to the assignment,
the accounts were not "involved in the business" when the lien was
22 id.
" Id. § 337.010(l)(c).
24 1d. § 376.160.
25 Id. § 376.150(1).
26 id.
27 Of course, the term "property" permits the lien to attach to any interest in real
property used in carrying on the business. This Article is concerned only with personal
property.
28 Fels v. George Lueders & Co., 246 F. 436, 437 (6th Cir. 1917). At the time of the
Fels case, the statute, KY. GEN. STAT. § 2487, creating the lien extended the lien to
persons who furnished materials to the business. Lueders and Co. was such an entity. Fels,
246 F. at 437.
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activated. 9 Noting that the accounts were surely "so involved" before
they were pledged, the court found that because the assignment was
"merely a security," the accounts were never withdrawn from the
business.30 Accordingly, the court thought "it clear ... that all the
assigned accounts were. . 'involved in the business' within the meaning
of the statute."'
Courts addressing the employees' lien have not interpreted the phrase
"accessories connected therewith."32 However, it should be given its
general meaning as something incidental to the main plrpose. The word
accessories does not seem to enlarge to any great extent the property
which the lien encumbers because an accessory connected to the business
property would seem to be included as part of the "property involved in
the business." For example, suppose a coal mining company owns a
computer system for use by its clerical employees. The computer system
would be incidental to the main purpose of the business (mining coal),
but, besides being an accessory, it would also seem to be property
involved in the business. This interpretation of accessory comports with
the Uniform Commercial Code's ("U.C.C.") Article Nine definition of
"accessory," as an article of personalty connected to an existing article of
personalty,33 i.e., a part of "property involved in the business."
An interesting aspect of the lien is its perfection requirements, or
more accurately, its lack of such requirements.34 Unlike other statutory
liens created by Chapter 376 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the
employees' lien requires no public filing and no possession of the liened
property for perfection. The statutes creating the employees' lien are
silent regarding such requirements. This silence has resulted in the courts
consistently construing the statutes as requiring no filing of a notice of
lien to perfect it.3
6
29 Fels, 246 F. at 438.
" Id. at 437.
31 Id.
32 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.150(1) (Baldwin 1994).
33 Id. § 355.9-314(1).
4 Perfection denotes the steps required to make the lien effective against persons
other than the debtor and the steps required to insure that the lien attains the highest
possible priority against other interests in the encumbered property; see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (6th ed. 1990).
31 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.010-.120 (Baldwin 1994), for a lien requiring
public filing for perfection and § 376.290 for a lien requiring possession for perfection.
36 Leslie's Adm'x v. Branham, 158 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Ky. 1942) (stating that
"[c]laimants of liens under [§] 2487 [Kentucky Revised Statutes § 376.150] of our
Statutes are relieved of filing the notices required in any other section .... "); Rockcastle
1995-96]
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Both possession and filing provide a public notice function so that the
lack of either is a significant omission. The rationale for the lack of a
possession requirement may stem from the fact that an employee typically
does not have the authority to take possession of the property of the
business. Omitting any filing requirement implies a legislative intent to
insure existence of the lien in favor of the employee. The purpose of the
statute was eloquently stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The statute is based upon a well-recognizedpolicy, which is written into
the statutes of many states and of the federal government, and that is to
protect the wage earner in many forms of public endeavor who is
necessarily dependent upon his daily labor for the sustenance and the
support of himself and family, and particularly in such forms as are
recognized to be primarily for the benefit of the public good. 7
However, there is a limitation of action provision that affects
enforcement of the lien. Section 376.190 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes provides a statute of limitations for enforcing the lien. "Action
to enforce the lien shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the
assignment, or from the date when the property goes into the hands of a
receiver or trustee, or from the date when the business is stopped,
suspended or sold . ,38
Thus, to enforce the lien an employee need only file an action in
court within the proper time. The Kentucky cases have consistently held
that enforcement of the lien depends upon the filing of an action within
the sixty-day period. 9
Lumber Co. v. Burns, 194 S.W. 95, 100 (Ky. 1917) ("It is true that in order to perfect
this character of lien no notice need be filed with the county court clerk . . .");
Gugenheim v. Watkins, 181 S.W. 357, 359 (Ky. 1916) ("It was therefore not necessary
for appellees to have filed statements with the county clerk to protect their liens .... ).
"' Turner v. Randolph, 280 S.W. 462,463 (Ky. 1926) (holding that employees' liens
for wages due within six months before a corporation's property is distributed to creditors
are superior to vendor's lien).
3 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.190 (Baldwin 1994).
w International Harvester Co. v. Dyer's Adm'r, 178 S.W.2d 966, 968 (Ky. 1944)
(holding that mine workers have a lien for wages since they filed their claims within 60
days); McClone v. Smith, 168 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1943) (holding that no superior lien
was acquired when claim was filed four months after business was suspended); Freeman
v. Craft, 294 S.W. 822, 826-28 (Ky. 1927) (holding that when a wage claim is filed one
day late it is error to give it priority over a mortgage lien). But see In re Falls City Shirt
Mfg. Co., 98 F. 592, 595-96 (D. Ky. 1899) (applying the bankruptcy law period for filing
claims to the wage lien). Contra RockcastleLumber Co., 194 S.W. at 100 (holding that
appointment of creditor's committee does not excuse lien claimant from taking necessary
322 [Vol. 84
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When the lien is activated by certain events, there is an alternate
method of enforcing it. Section 376.190 allows a party to file the action
in the sixty-day period, or timely file the "claims for which a lien is
asserted.... with the person authorized to receive and report claims."4
When the event activating the employees' lien is an assignment for
benefit of creditors,4' the appointment of a receiver,42 or a federal
bankruptcy, a person to receive claims against the debtor will exist. In
such cases a party may enforce the lien by filing the claim with the
proper person, or by instituting an action.43 An employee need not do
both.44
Because the priority given the lien is dependent upon compliance
with the statute's time requisites, claimants of the lien must take care to
comply. The Kentucky courts agree that failure to conform to the
statute's time limitations results in loss of priority. 5
Two distinct priorities are awarded the employees' lien. Section
376.160 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes makes the lien superior to
the lien of any mortgage or encumbrance "thereafter created., 46 This
priority comports with the typical "first in time, first in right"
priority. Under the statute's grant, the employees' lien which arises,
for instance, upon suspension of the business, is superior to any
mortgage or encumbrance arising after the suspension of the busi-
ness.
4 7
The second grant of priority provided by section 376.160 is more like
a super priority; pursuant to it the employees' lien is awarded priority
over any mortgage or encumbrance, "theretofore or thereafter created., 41
However, this priority, unlike the aforementioned priority, is not given
for the "whole amount due the employees. '9 It is limited to a lien for
steps to perfect his lien).
40 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.190 (Baldwin 1994).
41 Id. §§ 379.010-.170.
42 Id. § 425.600.
41 In the situation of a federal bankruptcy proceeding, the ability to take action to
enforce the lien after commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding depends upon
obtaining relief from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(1) (1993).
44 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).
45 Freeman v. Craft, 294 S.W. 822, 826-28 (Ky. 1927); Rockcastle Lumber Co. v.
Bums, 194 S.W. 95, 100 (Ky. 1917); Gugenheim v. Watkins, 181 S.W. 357, 359 (Ky.
1916).
46 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).47 1rd.
481 Id. (emphasis added).
49 id.
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wages owed the employee within the six months preceding the event
which activates the lien.50
To illustrate these priorities, consider the following example. Suppose
a sales associate of a manufacturing company is paid a salary plus a
monthly commission. For each of the past seven months the associate
earned $600 in commission. However, the associate has not been paid
any commission for the last seven months. One year ago, the company
granted the bank a security interest in its inventory. A labor strike now
forces the company to suspend its operations. After the business
suspension, the company grants a security interest in its inventory to a
supplier of raw materials used in manufacturing its goods. Pursuant to the
statutory scheme of priority, the sales associate would have a lien
superior to both secured creditors for the sales commission earned in the
previous six months. Regarding the commission earned in the preceding
seventh month, the lien is superior only to the subsequent security interest
- the security interest of the supplier of raw materials. The lien for the
seventh month's commission is subordinate to the bank, a secured
creditor whose interest antedates the employees' lien. Kentucky cases
considering the priority of the employees' lien have consistently upheld
the statutory grant of superiority5' and super priority against an attack
that it resulted in an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual
obligation.52
II. PRaoRloY BETWEEN THE LIEN
AND AN ARTICLE NINE SECURITY INTEREST
The preceding example raises the next issue for discussion: Is the
statutory priority scheme of the employees' lien operative against a
security interest created pursuant to Article Nine of the U.C.C.? The
Kentucky General Assembly originally passed the employee lien statute
on March 20, 1876."3 From its earliest adoption, the lien was awarded
superiority over mortgages and other encumbrances whether they were
created before or after the lien arose.5 4 Although the lien statute has
50 Id.
"' International Harvester Co. v. Dyer's Adm'r, 178 S.W.2d 966, 969 (Ky. 1944);
Leslie's Adm'x v. Branham, 158 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Ky. 1942); Gugenheim v. Watkins,
181 S.W. 357, 360 (Ky. 1916).
52 Turner v. Randolph, 280 S.W. 462, 463 (Ky. 1926).
13 JOURNAL OF THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 1393 (1875-76).
54 "The said lien shall be superior to the lien of any mortgage or other encumbrance
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been amended over the years, the lien's superiority over antecedent
encumbrances has remained intact.' Furthermore, the legislature has not
amended the statutory priority scheme since the adoption of the U.C.C.
Two arguments can be made regarding priority between the lien and the
security interest: One can argue that the priority scheme of the lien statute
should be followed; or one can argue that the priority scheme of Article
Nine of the U.C.C. should be followed.
This article previously discussed the priority awarded the lien by
section 376.160 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.16 Pursuant to that
statute, the employees' lien is "superior to the lien of any mortgage or
other encumbrance ....",5 If the priority accorded to the lien by that
section is to operate against an Article Nine security interest, a security
interest must be considered to be a "lien of any mortgage or other
encumbrance."58 No Kentucky cases have considered the question, so
the answer must be found by examining the definitions of "lien" and
"security interest."
The U.C.C. defines a security interest as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation."59 The essence of the security interest is that it gives the
secured creditor a property-like interest in the debtor's personal property
which the secured creditor can use to satisfy the debtor's obligation.6"
The secured creditor does not obtain title to the property,6" but only the
right to dispose of the property to satisfy the obligation.62
Neither the employees' lien statute, the U.C.C., nor any other
Kentucky statute defines "lien." Kentucky case law has defined lien as "a
charge upon [property]. It is a right which the law gives to have a debt
satisfied out of the property ... ."63 Surely a security interest fulfills
that definition. A security interest is an interest in property, which can be
deemed a "charge" upon property, and its function is to satisfy a debt out
heretofore or hereafter created, and shall be for the whole amount due such employes as
such, or due for such materials or supplies ...." KY. GEN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2, at 983
(Bullitt & Feland 1881).
15 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).
56 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.57 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).58 id.
591 Id. § 355.1-201(37).
60 Id. § 355.9-504.
61 Id. § 355.1-201(37).
62 U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1994).
63 Bruner v. Home for the Aged of the Little Sisters of the Poor, 429 S.W.2d 381,
382-83 (Ky. 1968) (defining "lien").
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of the property so charged.' Therefore, one can conclude that the
concept of lien includes a security interest.
Building upon that conclusion, the security interest is seemingly
subordinate to the employees' lien whenever the statutory basis for
superiority is satisfied. When the lien antedates the security interest,
section 376.160 awards the lien priority over the security interest "for the
whole amount due the employes . "...65 When the security interest
antedates the employees' lien, section 376.160 awards the lien priority
"for wages coming due to them within six months before ' 16 the occur-
rence of the event that activates the lien. A literal application of the
statutory priority scheme results in the superiority of the lien over the
U.C.C. Article Nine security interest in the designated factual situations.
The manifest intent of the statute also supports the superiority of the
lien over the security interest. The legislature clearly awarded the lien
priority over mortgages and other encumbrances.67 Although the precise
meaning of "other encumbrances" is not definite, the concept of "mort-
gages" is more certain. A mortgage conventionally is considered to be a
contractual relationship in a consensual transaction where a debtor grants
a creditor an interest in property to secure a debt." Of course, the
legislature did not enact the priority provisions of the employees' lien
with the Article Nine security interest in mind. However, a security
interest arises in a transaction highly similar to that of a mortgage. It also
arises in a consensual transaction in which an interest in property
(personal property or fixtures) is granted to secure a debt.69 Since a
security interest is virtually identical to a mortgage, application of the
statutory priority scheme against a security interest comports with the
intent of the legislature to subordinate other encumbrances to the lien.
64 KY. REv. STAT. AN. § 355.1-201(37) (Baldwin 1994).6 5 Id. § 376.160.
66 id.
67 id.
68 See Watt's Adm'r v. Smith, 63 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Ky. 1933) ("[A] mortgage
creates only a lien on real estate in favor of the mortgagee, the legal title being left in the
mortgagor .... [A] mortgage is a mere security for debt."); Smith v. Berry, 181 S.W.
379, 382 (Ky. 1916) (holding that a mortgage is a mere lien or security for the payment
ofmoney and does not convey any title to the mortgagee); Cumber & Pearce v. Chandler,
5 Ky. L. Rptr. 185, 185 (Ky. 1883) ("[M]ortgage conveys the legal title simply as a
pledge for the mortgage debt, but confers on the mortgagee none of the rights of
ownership."); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (6th ed. 1990) ("A mortgage is an interest
in land created by a written instrument providing security for the performance of a duty
or the payment of a debt.").
69 U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) & cmts. (1994).
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Although there have been no reported Kentucky decisions addressing
the priority between an employees' lien and a security interest, several
cases have addressed the priority of the lien against a chattel mortgage.
Leslie's Administratrix v. Branham," McGlone v. Smith,71 and Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Dyer's Administrator,2 all involved a conflict
where the debtor had granted a "mortgage" in items of personal property,
i.e., a chattel mortgage, to the creditor. In each of those cases the court
applied the statutory priority scheme of the employees' lien without
discussing whether the scheme was applicable against chattel mortgag-
es.73 Thus, it appears that courts have routinely applied the statute to
other encumbrances, as if they too were "liens".
Although construction of employees' lien statutes leads to the
conclusion that the lien is superior to the security interest, the U.C.C.
must be examined to determine whether its provisions affect such a
conclusion. Thus, the inquiry becomes whether the U.C.C. displaces the
priority scheme of the employees' lien statutes.
Article One, the General Provisions article of the U.C.C., provides
general interpretation provisions to be used in construction of the other
articles.74 Section 1-103 provides that the principles of law and equity
shall supplement the provisions of the U.C.C., "[u]nless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Chapter [of the U.C.C.] . . ... 7 In this
initial pronouncement, the U.C.C. is receptive to the application of the
employees' lien and its priority scheme against a security interest.
The next inquiry is into the provisions of Article Nine, the Secured
Transactions article. Three sections of Article Nine impact this issue: 9-
102, 9-104 and 9-310. Section 9-102 is entitled "Policy and Subject
Matter of Article." Subsection (2) of 9-102 provides that Article Nine
"does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-
3 10. ''7' That exclusion is not surprising given that the purpose of the
section is "to bring all consensual security interests in personal property
and fixtures under this Article ....,7 Statutory liens, including the
employees' lien, are not consensual, and thus they are not within Article
70 158 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1942).
71 168 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1943).
72 178 S.W.2d 966 (Ky. 1944).
' InternationalHarvesterCo., 178 S.W.2d at 968; McGlone v. Smith, 168 S.W.2d
566, 568 (Ky. 1943); Leslie's Adm'x, 158 S.W.2d at 950-51.
74 U.C.C. § 1-102 (1994).
" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-103 (Baldwin 1994).
76 U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1994).
77 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 1.
1995-961
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Nine.7" Section 9-104 is entitled "Transactions Excluded From Article."
It includes a list of transactions to which Article Nine does not apply.79
Subsection (c) of 9-104 excludes from Article Nine "a lien given by
statute or other rule of law for services or materials except as provided
in section 9-310 on priority of such liens."8 According to this provi-
sion, a lien given for services or materials created either by statute or
case law is excluded from Article Nine. According to the Official
Comment, the drafters of Article Nine believed it was unnecessary and
inappropriate for Article Nine to encompass those liens because of their
connection to local conditions and their distance from commercial
financing.81 One could argue that the employees' lien is a lien awarded
for "services," and thus it is excluded from Article Nine. If application
of these U.C.C. sections results in exclusion of the lien from Article
Nine, then the priority scheme of the wage lien should operate to award
the lien priority over a security interest. However, both sections 9-102
and 9-104 exclude liens except as provided in section 9-3 10.82 More-
over, the comment to section 9-104 provides that although section 9-
104(c) excludes statutory liens from the article, "[s]ection 9-310 states a
rule for determining priorities between such liens and the consensual
security interests covered by this Article. 8 3 That statement indicates that
although Article Nine does not govern the creation of statutory liens, it
may govern their priority. Thus, one must explore the meaning of section
9-310.
Section 9-310, entitled "Priority of Certain Liens Arising by
Operation of Law," provides as follows:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien
upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of
law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected
security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly
provides otherwise.84
It is clear that the scope of the section is over liens awarded for
services or materials. Its function is to resolve priority conflicts between
78 Id. § 9-102(2).
79 Id. § 9-104.
80Id. § 9-104(c).
81 Id. § 9-104 cmt. 3.
2 1d. §§ 9-102(2), 9-104(c).
831 Id. § 9-104 cmt. 3.841d. § 9-310.
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a lien and a security interest, and it does so only when the security
interest antedates the lien."5 Furnishing services or materials to "goods
subject to a security interest"' 6 indicates the presence of a security
interest at the time the services are furnished. Beyond that, several
questions are raised regarding the application of section 9-310's priority
rule to the employees' lien. Does an employee who claims a lien pursuant
to section 376.150 furnish "services" to goods? In a broad sense, one can
argue that every employee furthers the business of the company, and
when that business involves goods, every employee furnishes services to
goods. An employee who works in the manufacturing phase of a business
is arguably within the scope of section 9-310. But does, for instance, a
clerical worker, a personnel manager, or a custodian furnish services to
goods? The comment to section 9-310 indicates that the section's purpose
is to award priority to liens arising from work "intended to enhance or
preserve the value of the collateral .. .."" Whether such employees'
work enhances or preserves the value of the collateral is questionable.
Furthermore, even a manufacturing employee does not actually "enhance
or preserve" the collateral; such an employee produces the collateral. The
lien is also available to employees who work in nonmanufacturing
businesses.8" It is illogical to conclude that such employees furnish
services to goods. The priority conflict resolved by section 9-3 10 involves
liens of persons who preserve or enhance the value of the collateral.8 9
The employees' lien covers all employees of a business.9" Accordingly,
it does not seem to be a lien within the scope of section 9-3 10.
If, however, an employee is deemed to furnish services or materials
to the collateral so that its lien is within the scope of section 9-310, the
secured creditor now plays its trump card. Section 9-3 10 awards priority
to a lien given "upon goods in the possession of such person ....,
The secured creditor would argue that unless the employee is in
possession of the goods, the lien does not have priority over the security
interest.
Whether that contention is accurate depends upon how the possession
requirement of section 9-310 is construed.92 Is the lienholder's posses-
s Id. § 9-3 10 cmt. 1.
16 1d. § 9-310.
87Id. § 9-310 cmt. 1.
88 See 9 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-
310:02 (1993).
89 Id.
90 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.150-.160 (Baldwin 1994).
9'U.C.C. § 9-310 (1994).
92 See 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 88, at § 9-310:02.
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sion of the goods a requirement for priority, or is it a requirement for
activation of section 9-310? If possession is required for priority over the
security interest, it is likely that the employees' lien will be subordinate
because it is unlikely that the employees will have possession of the
goods subject to the security interest. If the possession requirement is
viewed as a condition to the activation of section 9-310, then the section
does not apply to liens which are deemed nonpossessory liens - liens
which do not require possession of the encumbered property to be
effective.93 If section 9-310 is not applicable, then resolution of the
priority conflict between the lien and the security interest is governed by
the Kentucky employees' lien statutes.94 As discussed above, that law
awards the lien superiority."
Some cases addressing the issue have concluded that possession of
the liened goods is required for priority, but others have concluded that
nonpossessory liens are not within the scope of section 9-310. Forrest
Cate Ford, Inc. v Fryar represents the view that possession is re-
quired.96 In Forest, the lienholder repaired several vehicles owned by
Fryar, but it did not retain possession of the vehicles. 97 Pursuant to the
Tennessee statutes, possession was not a requirement for effectiveness of
the lien.98 Without discussing whether section 9-310 was applicable to
a lien not requiring possession, the court decided that the priority between
the lien and a security interest "must be decided based upon an interpreta-
tion of [section 9-310]." '9 An examination of the statute led the court
to find that:
[t]he wordage of the statute, given its clear meaning and full im-
port, limited this priority to those liens upon "goods in the posses-
sion of" the artisan or repairman .... We conclude that the plain
import of [section 9-310] is the repairman must retain possession of the
vehicle repaired in order to maintain the priority of his statutory lien
... over that of a previously perfected security interest in the same
vehicle. 00
93 id.
94 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).
9 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
96 465 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
97Id. at 882.
98Id. at 883.
99 Id.
'Id. at 884.
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However, the majority of cases considering the issue have disagreed
with the conclusion that section 9-310 is applicable to nonpossessory
liens. '0 Brazier Forest Industries, Inc. v. Northern Transport, Inc."10
typifies such opinions. Brazier involved a conflict between a security
interest and statutory loggers and stumpage liens.'0 3 The effectiveness
of the liens was not dependent upon possession of the encumbered goods
by the lienholders. 0 4 Accordingly, the lienholders argued that pursuant
to sections 9-102(2), 9-104(c) and 9-310, Article Nine did not govern the
conflict.0 5 However, the secured party argued that pursuant to section 9-
310 only a lienholder in possession of the goods is superior to the
security interest. 0 6 Relying on the Washington Bar Association desk-
book statement that a nonpossessory lien is not affected by section 9-310,
and decisions in other jurisdictions, the court held that "nonpossessory
liens are outside the scope of section 9-310 ..... 107 The court's
interpretation was based on the belief that such construction "is more
reasonable than inferring from the provision [section 9-310] that all
nonpossessory liens are subordinate to perfected security interests."'0 8
Secured creditors have argued that the negative implication of section
9-3 10 is that if a lien is not within the scope of section 9-3 10, then it is
subordinate to the security interest. 09 Their contention is based on a
1o1 First Md. Leasecorp v. M/V Golden Egret, 764 F.2d 749, 754 (1 1th Cir. 1985)
(holding that Article Nine does not establish a system of priorities for nonpossessory
statutory liens); Ameritrust Nat'l Bank v. Domore Corp., 147 B.R. 473,477 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1992) (holding that Article Nine only covers priority of possessory nonconsensual
liens); Smith v. Atlantic Boat Builder Co., 356 So. 2d 359, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that Article Nine does not apply to nonpossessory liens); Church Bros. Body
Serv., Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 559 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990) (quoting In re Brazier Forest Prods., Inc., 724 P.2d 970, 976-78 (Wash. 1986)
(holding that nonpossessory liens are outside the scope of Article Nine)); Leger Mill Co.,
Inc. v. Kleen-Leen, Inc., 563 P.2d 132, 136 (Okla. 1977) (holding the Uniform
Commercial Code totally inapplicable to nonpossessoryliens); Brazier Forest Indus., Inc.
v. Northern Transp., Inc., 724 P.2d 970, 978 (Wash. 1986) (holding that nonpossessory
liens are outside scope of Article Nine). Several commentators agree that § 9-310 is not
applicable to nonpossessory liens. See, e.g., 8 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 88, § 9-
104:04; Gerald F. Hess, Priority Conflicts Between Security Interest and Washington
Statutory Liens for Services or Materials, 25 GONz. L. REv. 453 (1990).
102 724 P.2d 970 (Wash. 1986).
103 Id. at 973.
104Id. at 977.
1051d.106
zrd.
"'
7 Id. at 978.
108 Id.
09 In FirstMarylandLeasecorp, several creditors argued that, because nonpossessory
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
construction of Article Nine that a statutory lien is superior to a security
interest only if the lien is within the scope of section 9-310 and satisfies
the section's requirements." 0 Pursuant to that construction, if nonposses-
sory liens are not within the scope of section 9-310, they will be inferior
to security interests."' This argument fails to consider sections 9-102(2)
and 9-104(c). If section 9-310 was the only Article Nine provision
addressing the issue, one might concede that a failure to fulfill its criteria
results in subordination of the lien. However, sections 9-102 and 9-104
indicate the drafters' intent to exclude statutory liens from the coverage
of Article Nine, except to the extent that section 9-310 provides for liens
for services and materials." 2 Thus, to conclude that a lien either is
within the scope of section 9-310 or is inferior to a security interest does
not consider all the relevant provisions of Article Nine.
Admittedly, there is nothing in the text of section 9-310 that prohibits
a construction that the lien given priority in section 9-310 is a lien for
services or materials on goods "in the possession" of the person who
furnished the same. In fact, that is exactly what the words of section 9-
310 provide.13 Moreover, there is no section in Article Nine which
provides that the priority of nonpossessory liens is governed by other law.
However, construing section 9-310 as requiring possession for priority in
the cases of both possessory and nonpossessory liens also ignores other
construction tools and the policy behind many statutory liens. Section 9-
310's title indicates that not all liens come within its scope. Section 9-310
is entitled "Priority of Certain Liens Arising by Operation of Law."..
The drafter's use of "Certain Liens" allows for an interpretation that the
scope of the section is not over all statutory liens. As noted above,
sections 9-102 and 9-104 also indicate that some liens are not within the
scope of Article Nine. Subordinating all nonpossessory liens may also
contravene the policy behind statutory liens. It is entirely possible that
state legislatures, in creating statutory liens, intended that the liens would
be superior to all other encumbrances. Many such liens are explicitly
liens are excluded, the intent of the Code is to make them inferior to a secured interest.
764 F.2d 749, 755 (1 Ith Cir. 1985); In Leger Mill Co., Inc., the creditor also argued that
the intent of the Code was to make nonpossessory liens inferior to a secured interest. 563
P.2d 132, 135 (Okla. 1977).
... FirstMd. Leasecorp, 764 F.2d at 755.
". Id. at 755-56.
"' See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
"3 "[A] lien upon goods in the possession of such person.., takes priority over a
perfected security interest ..... U.C.C. § 9-310 (1994).
"
4 Id. (emphasis added).
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superior to other interests."' As the court in Brazier Forest Industries
noted, interpreting section 9-310 as inapplicable to nonpossessory liens
"is more reasonable than inferring from the provision [section 9-310] that
all nonpossessory liens are subordinate to perfected security inter-
ests... 6 This interpretation is more reasonable because of Article Nine's
policy of excluding statutory liens and because of the massive subordina-
tion of liens that would occur if nonpossessory liens were governed by
section 9-3 10.
The foregoing analysis indicates that holders of Kentucky's employ-
ees' liens have two grounds upon which to base an argument that it is
not subject to the priority scheme of section 9-310. First, an employee
can argue that he or she does not furnish services and materials to goods.
Section 9-310 covers only liens given to providers of services or
materials; thus, such employees are not within the scope of the section.
Second, a holder of the lien can argue that nonpossessory liens are not
within the section's scope. The priority scheme of the section is activated
when a statutory lien, whose requirements include possession, conflicts
with a security interest. The employees' lien does not require possession
for effectiveness against the property, and thus it is not within section 9-
310's scope.
A Kentucky decision arguably supports the construction that section
9-310 creates a priority scheme that determines priority of nonpossessory
as well as possessory liens. Of course, under such a construction, the
Kentucky employees' lien would be subordinate to the security interest.
In ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v Madisonville Recapping Co., a
repair company performed repairs and supplied tires to equipment subject
to a purchase money security interest."17 When the owner failed to pay
for the services and goods, Madisonville Recapping claimed a lien on the
equipment pursuant to section 376.440 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes." 8 The effectiveness of that statutory lien is not dependent
upon the lienholder's retention of possession of the goods, and Madison-
ville Recapping did not have possession."9 In fact, due to the nature of
1' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-11-60 (1991) (giving watercraft lien priority over other
liens); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-20-102(1)(a) (West 1987) (agistor's lien is superior
to all other liens); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-24-2 (Burns 1980) (employees' lien superior
to all liens except those filed of record 60 days before employees' lien); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 60.24.038 (West 1990) (giving logger's lien priority over other liens).
"
6 Brazier Forest Indus., Inc. v. Northern Transp., Inc., 724 P.2d 970, 978 (Wash.
1986).
117 793 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
"1 Id. at 850.
191d.
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the goods, mining equipment, the services were performed on the debtor's
premises. 2 Among the issues addressed by the court were whether the
lien was superior to the security interest pursuant to section 9_310.21
Employing the words of section 9-310, the secured creditor argued that
a lien is superior only as to goods in possession of a lienholder, and
accordingly, the lien is subordinate. 22 The court noted that "courts have
a duty to construe a statute literally unless to do so would lead to an
absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion."'2 3 It then found that
"[r]equiring possession for [section] 355.9-310 [of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes] to be effective would not lead to an absurd or wholly unreason-
able result.' ' 24 The lienholder argued that possession should not be
required in cases, such as this, where the machinery was so large that
repair on the owner's premises was necessary. 25 The court rejected that
argument by noting "that the plain meaning of a statute cannot be ignored
by the courts simply because another interpretation might be considered
to state a better policy... [section] 355.9-310 [of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes] is clear and unambiguous in its requirement of possession by the
lienholder."' 26
Although the court's decision supports the interpretation of section 9-
310 that the lienholders' possession of the goods is required for superiori-
ty over security interests, it cannot be said that the issue is decided
conclusively. There is no indication in the opinion that the lienholders
argued that section 9-310 is not activated when the lien is not dependent
upon possession. Consequently, the court did not consider such an
argument. When that argument has been made, the majority of courts
have held section 9-310 inapplicable.'27 It therefore seems reasonable
that the Kentucky courts might reach the same result and award the non-
possessory lien priority over the security interest. That is the proper
construction.
Ill. BANKRUPTCY AND THE EMPLOYEES' LIEN
It takes little imagination to foresee that the employees' lien may
attach when the company has filed a bankruptcy petition. Filing a
120 Id.
21 Id. at 851.
122 id.
' Id. at 852.
124Id.
lZS Id.
126 id.
121 See supra note 101 and accornpanying text.
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bankruptcy petition is likely encompassed by section 376.150 in the
words "assigned for the benefit of, or are to be distributed among
creditors, whether by operation of law or by its own act... ,,,12' or the
words "company ... suspends ... its business."'2 9 In these cases the
issue of superiority over a secured creditor gives way to a more important
issue: is the employees' lien effective in bankruptcy?
Employees of a business which has filed a bankruptcy petition would
find the employees' lien attractive for several reasons. First, a claim
against the debtor secured by a lien on property of the estate is a secured
claim pursuant to § 506(a) of Title 11 of the United States Code
("Bankruptcy Code"). 30 Secured claimholders are favored in the
bankruptcy distribution process.' Second, although wage claims are
generally a priority claim under § 507(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, that
priority is limited to $4000 per claimant and to claims for compensation
earned within ninety days before the date of filing the petition in
bankruptcy.'32 The Kentucky employees' lien has no such limitations.
Thus, assuming that the value of the business property equals or exceeds
the amount of the lien, the lienholder fares better than a priority claim
holder. Finally, when the value of the liened property exceeds the
employees' claims, the employees, as holders of secured claims, are
entitled to interest on their claims pursuant to § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code.'33
The validity of the lien in bankruptcy will depend upon whether it
survives the trustee's power to avoid statutory liens.'34 Without question
the employees' lien is a statutory lien.'35 Section 545 of the Bankruptcy
128 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.150 (Baldwin 1994).
129 Id. § 376.180.
30 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
31 Generally, holders of secured claims in a Chapter Seven bankruptcy receive either
the collateral or payment of the claim, or the security interest is unaffected by the
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 506, 524, 554, 722, 725 (1993). In Chapter 11 or 13
bankruptcies, the debtor generally must either propose full payment of the secured claim,
obtain the secured claimholder's consent to the plan, provide the creditor with the
equivalent of its secured claim, or sell the collateral and grant a security interest in the
sale proceeds. Id. §§ 1123, 1124, 1129, 1325.
'
32 Id. § 507(a)(3).
,33 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that
the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the payment of interest on an oversecured claim).
131 See In re County Club Mkt., 162 B.R. 226, 231-32 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds, 175 B.R. 1005 (D. Minn. 1994).
' "[S]tatutory lien" means lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified
circumstances or conditions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory,
but does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such
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Code authorizes the trustee to "avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on
property of the debtor" in certain situations. A trustee may avoid a lien
that:
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor -
(A) when a case under this title concerning the debtor is com-
menced;
(B) when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title
concerning the debtor is commenced;
(C) when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take or takes
possession;
(D) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(E) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a specified
standard; or
(F) at the time of an execution against property of the debtor levied
at the instance of an entity other than the holder of such statutory
lien;
136
Examining the statutory provisions of the Kentucky employees' lien
against the situations allowing avoidance by a trustee reveals that several
of the events that activate the lien may also trigger the trustee's avoidance
power. Pursuant to section 376.150 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the
lien arises when the property or effects of a business "are assigned for the
benefit of, or are to be distributed among creditors, whether by operation
of law or by its own act."'137 An assignment for the benefit of creditors
involves transferring property to a third person to liquidate it and
distribute its proceeds, much like a Chapter Seven bankruptcy. 138
Consequently, a court is likely to find that those events come within the
§ 545(1) situations of "custodian.., appointed or authorized to take...
possession,"' 39 or commencement of "an insolvency proceeding other
than under this title .... The Kentucky employees' lien also arises
pursuant to section 376.180 of Kentucky Revised Statutes when the
property of a company is taken in attachment or execution so that the
interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not
such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute ....
11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (1993).
136 Id. § 545(1).
137 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.150 (Baldwin 1994).
138 Id. § 379.010.
139 11 U.S.C. § 545(1)(C) (1993).
14 Id. § 545(1)(B).
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business is stopped or suspended.14 ' A court could find that such an
event is indistinguishable from § 545(1)(F)'s situation where a lien
becomes effective upon "execution against property of the debtor
.... ,
142 If a court concludes that the event activating the employees'
lien comes within the situations enumerated in § 545(1), the trustee is
able to avoid the lien. If the lien is avoided, the employees would have
only the § 507 priority claim against the company.
However, there are events which activate the statutory lien that are
not included in the § 545(1) situations. Pursuant to section 376.180 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, the lien attaches when the company "sus-
pends, sells or transfers its business."' 43 Those events alone do not
trigger the operation of § 545(l)." If the employees' lien is effective
in bankruptcy, the employees' claim would be classified as a secured
claim. 4 As holders of secured claims, employees would achieve the
preferred status discussed previously. 
4 6
The nonapplicability of § 545(1) does not end the bankruptcy
trustee's scrutiny; the employee's lien might yet be avoided under
§ 545(2). Pursuant to § 545(2), the trustee may avoid the fixing of a
statutory lien to the extent that the lien "is not perfected or enforceable
at the time of the commencement of the case against a bona fide
purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the commencement
of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exits .... ", Section
545(2) equips the trustee, as of the commencement of the case, with the
rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of property. 48 The trustee's
exercise of those rights may allow it to avoid the employees' lien. For
purposes of this Article, the operative words of § 545(2)'s test of whether
the trustee can avoid the statutory lien are, "the trustee may avoid ... a
statutory lien ... to the extent that such lien ... is not perfected or
enforceable ... against a bona fide purchaser . .. ,, 4' These words
create a test that allows a trustee to nullify a statutory lien if it is not
perfected or enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. However, if the
,4, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.180 (Baldwin 1994).
142 11 U.S.C. § 545(I)(F) (1993).
143 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.180 (Baldwin 1994).
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 545(1) (1993).
145 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978).
'
4 6 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
147 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1993).
141"Hypothetical" because the right is given "whether or not such a purchaser exists."
Id.
149 Id. § 545.
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statutory lien is perfected or enforceable against a bona fide purchaser,
the trustee cannot avoid it.'
50
Because "perfected" has a generally accepted meaning to be
discussed,' this discussion initially focus on the function of the phrase
"or enforceable.., against a bona fide purchaser." Does it 1) qualify or
explain "perfected"; 2) create a separate method of preventing avoidance;
or 3) merely give an example of the effect of "perfected?" If the phrase
qualifies or explains perfected, then perfected can be defined as the state
of being enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. Accordingly, if the
lien is so enforceable, it is perfected and cannot be avoided.1 2 If the
phrase creates a separate test of preventing avoidance by the trustee, then
the statutory lien survives in bankruptcy if it is perfected or if it is
enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. If the phrase merely gives an
example of the effect of perfected, then to prevent avoidance the lien
must be perfected.
The history of § 545 of the Bankruptcy Code may aid in the
construction of the "enforceable" phrase. Unfortunately, scant congressio-
nal history regarding § 545 of the Bankruptcy Code exists. What does
exist indicates that § 545 was derived from § 67b and 67c of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1 3 The words of § 545(2) are virtually identi-
cal to the words of § 67c(l)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act. 54 Moreover,
there are no congressional statements that indicate any intent to change
the law from the construction given § 67b and 67c.' Consequently, it
"
5
' Id. § 545(2).
151 See infra notes 156-77 and accompanying text.
152See In re Aligeier & Dyer, Inc., 18 B.R. 82, 86-87 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1992)
(stating that a statutory lien is only valid as against a bankruptcy trustee if it is perfected
or enforceable against a bona fide purchaser).
153 "It [§ 545] is derived from subsections 67b and 67c of present law." S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5871; accordH.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 371 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6327.
"' The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
[E]very statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of
bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists ....
11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1976) (formerly § 67c(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
"' The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States intended to
substantially alter the Bankruptcy Act's treatment of statutory liens. It recommended a
section that voided a statutory lien unless it was "perfected as a matter of public record
. . or... notice of the lien is given to the trustee within 30 days of actual knowledge
by the lien claimant of the filing of the petition." REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 165 (1973). Obviously, Congress did not adopt the Commission's recommenda-
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is logical to give § 545 of the Bankruptcy Code the same construction
given § 67b and 67c of the Bankruptcy Act.
Commentators have construed the enforceability phrase of § 67c(1)(B)
as qualifying "perfected."
It is clear... that the enforceability of the statutory lien depends upon
its state of perfection as of the date the petition is filed. Have the
necessary steps been taken, by that date, to make the lien enforceable
against a bona fide purchaser? That is the question to determine its
validity.1
5 6
Courts have applied a bona fide purchaser test to determine whether
the lien is effective in bankruptcy.'57 If a statutory lien is enforceable
against a bona fide purchaser, then, in essence, it is perfected and is not
avoidable by the trustee. 58 Accordingly, the "enforceable" phrase of
§ 545(2) of the Bankruptcy Code could be construed as qualifying the
meaning of "perfected."
Notwithstanding the apparent congressional intent and the prior
construction of § 67c(1)(B), courts construing § 545(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code generally have viewed the phrase as creating either a separate test
of preventing avoidance or as an example of the effect of a perfected
lien. In re Loretto Winery Ltd., is illustrative of cases which view the
phrase as a separate test of preventing avoidance.'59 In that case the
tion.
1564 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 422-23 (14th ed. 1978)
(emphasis added).
"' In re Mission Marine Assoc., Inc., 633 F.2d 678, 680-81 (3d Cir. 1980)
("[A]ppellants rely on [§] 67(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act, which invalidates, against
a trustee in bankruptcy, statutory liens which would on the date of bankruptcy be invalid
against a bona fide purchaser from the debtor."); Limperis v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Phillips Constr. Co.), 579 F.2d 431,432 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Under the Federal Bankruptcy
Act, whether a statutory lien is valid against the trustee depends upon whether the lien is
enforceable against a bona fide purchaser, according to state law, on the date the
bankruptcy petition is filed."); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. La.) ("A
statutory lien will [not be recognized]... when ... it would not be enforceable against
a bona fide purchaser... on the date of bankruptcy."), aff'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. deniedsub nom. Bernard v. Benefial Finance Co., 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
15s See In re Mission Marine Assoc., Inc., 633 F.2d at 682.
9 898 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1990). Other courts employing a separate enforceable test
include Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Tape City, U.S.A., Inc. (In re Tape City
U.S.A., Inc.), 677 F.2d. 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1982) ("For the purposes of testing statutory
liens under this provision (§ 545(2)), the trustee is thus given the status of a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser ..... (quoting 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 156, at 545)); Stem v.
Munroe (In re Stem), 44 B.R. 15, 19 (Bankr. D.C. Mass. 1984) ("[I]t is my conclusion
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Ninth Circuit considered the avoidance under § 545(2) of a producer's
lien created by California statute. 60 Like the Kentucky employees' lien,
the California lien attached upon the occurrence of a particular event and
contained no perfection requirements. 6 ' Although the lien was not
perfected in the sense of "notice to the public," the court nevertheless
chose to analyze the avoidance question by determining the lien's validity
against a bona fide purchaser according to the laws of California. 62
The court found such an inquiry to be in accord with the scheme of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Because, under the scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, a statutory lien's
validity against a bona fide purchaser is determined under state law, we
conclude that the proper inquiry is whether the particular lien is good
against a bona fide purchaser under the laws of the state, California in
this case. 1
63
Examining the lien statute and its policy, the court found that the lien
would be valid against a bona fide purchaser."6 Consequently, avoid-
ance of the lien was not permitted. 165 This case evidences a construction
of § 545(2) wherein a statutory lien escapes avoidance, whether or not it
is perfected, if it is enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. Such a
construction recognizes the "enforceable" phrase as a separate test for
preserving a statutory lien.
Other cases seem to have applied the § 545(2) phrase in a manner
that makes it merely an example of the effect of a perfected statutory
lien. Such cases, in essence, require perfection of the lien to prevent
avoidance. 66 To these courts, if the lien is perfected it also will be
that the lien ... would be enforceable against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser as of
the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and, therefore, is not voidable under
[§] 545(2) .... "); Leach v. Connecticut (In re Leach), 15 B.R. 1005, 1009-10 (Bankr.
D.C. Conn. 1981) ("If the legislature ... had intended to make the State's lien ...
enforceable against a bona fide purchaser, it could have done so .....
"
60In reLoretto Winery Ltd., 898 F.2d at 717.
161 Id. at 720, 722.
162zId. at 720.
163 id.
"4 Id. at 720-24.
165Id. at 725.
166 Dairy Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Ramette (In re County Club Mkt., Inc.), 162 B.R. 226,
232 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) ("Therefore, the enforceability of a statutory lien depends
on whether it was perfected as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition."), rev'd
on other grounds, 175 B.R. 1005 (D. Minn. 1994); WisconsinDep't of Indus., Labor and
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enforceable against a bona fide purchaser.67 The focus of inquiry in
these cases is whether the lien is perfected. 6 Such courts usually fitst
quote § 545(2). 16 9 Some even note that § 545(2) grants the trustee the
status of a bona fide purchaser.17° However, when the avoidance issue
is considered, the court first determines the perfected status of the lien,
and, if it is perfected, the lien is not avoidable.17'
A bankruptcy court for the Western District of Kentucky has adopted
such a construction of § 545(2).172 That court was considering the
avoidance of a Kentucky statutory public improvement lien. 73 The
court followed the usual pattern of quoting § 545(2).' 1 It even created
a role for a bona fide purchaser: "Section 545(2) requires perfection of
the lien and establishes, essentially, a bona fide purchaser of property
subject to the lien, test to determine perfection."'75 One could argue this
quotation indicates that the Bankruptcy Court recognizes the separate
"enforceable against a bona fide purchaser" test. However, the court's
analysis deflects such an argument: "It is clear, therefore, that the
enforceability of the statutory lien depends upon its state of perfection as
of the date the petition is filed.' 76 That pronouncement indicates that
avoidance of the lien depends upon its perfection, with enforceability
relegated to an example of the effect of perfection.'77
Is one of these constructions of the "enforceable" phrase the correct
construction? The divergence of opinions indicates that the courts have
Human Relations v. Ludwig (In re Napcographic Arts, Inc.), 83 B.R. 558, 563 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. (1988)) ("In short, the trustee can avoid all statutory liens unless they are
perfected on the date of the petition."); Allgeier & Dyer, Inc. v. City of Bowling Green
(In re Allgeier & Dyer, Inc.), 18 B.R. 82, 86-87 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ("It is clear,
therefore, that the enforceability of the statutory lien depends upon its state of perfection
as of the date the petition is filed.").
167 DairyFresh Foods, 162 B.R. at 232; Ludwig, 83 B.R. at 563; Allgeier& Dyer, 18
B.R. at 86.
"'
68 Dairy Fresh Foods, 162 B.R. at 232; Ludwig, 83 B.R. at 563; Allgeier& Dyer, 18
B.R. at 86-87.
169 Ludwig, 83 B.R. at 563.
170 Dairy Fresh Foods, 162 B.R. at 232.
171 Allgeier & Dyer, 18 B.R. at 88.
172 Id. at 86-87.
171Id. at 83.
'
74 Id. at 86.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 86-87.
177 However, a subsequent statement by the court exhibits its vacillation between the
possible constructions of § 545(2): "[lIt is clear that the trustee has the power to avoid
liens that are not so perfectednor enforceable against him as of the date of the petition
.... Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
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not thought so. However, construing the clause as creating a separate
test of avoidance seems to be the appropriate construction. This con-
struction properly gives a disjunctive effect to the word "or" in the
phrase "perfected or enforceable ... against a bona fide purchaser"
in § 545(2).178 This construction comports with the legislative history
of § 545 and the construction of § 67c(1)(B), the predecessor to
§ 545.179 This construction also creates a test of avoidance that com-
ports with the logic of avoidance. 8 ' The reasoning of the Bankruptcy
Act, carried forward into the Bankruptcy Code, was to avoid state created
priorities; its purpose was not to avoid true liens. 8 ' If a statutory
lien is found to be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser, then a true
lien, rather than a priority claim, was intended. 82 For these reasons,
the "enforceable" phrase should be construed as creating a separate
test, the satisfaction of which prevents avoidance of the statutory
lien. 8 3
Notwithstanding the above choice of construction for the § 545(2)
"enforceable" phrase, since the courts have viewed it as both a separate
test and as a mere example of "perfected," the Kentucky employees' lien
must be examined to determine whether it is both perfected and
enforceable. The first inquiry is whether the employees' lien is "perfect-
ed" and thus not avoidable by the trustee.
The concept of perfection has it roots in bankruptcy law and is
generally involved with preventing the trustee's exercise of the avoidance
power. Perfection is a "status" which a lien or other transfer can attain.
Unfortunately, "perfected" is not defined in the definitions section of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, it is defined in § 547 - the Bankruptcy
Code section pertaining to avoidance of preferences. In that section,
perfection occurs, in real property transfers, when a bona fide purchaser
178 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988) (emphasis added).
179 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
181 MooRE, supra note 156, at 229-30 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965)).
182 1d, at 230-34.
183 There is a fourth possible construction of § 545(2). Such construction views the
subsection as creating only an enforceable lien against a bona fide purchaser. Under that
construction, the lien is avoidable, whetherperfected under applicable nonbankruptcy law,
if it is not enforceable (superior) to such a purchaser. This construction relegates
"perfected" to a synonym for "enforceable against a bona fide purchaser." This
interpretation is not discussed because no courts have clearly adopted it, and its
application would be no different than construing the enforceable clause as a separate test
of avoidance.
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cannot acquire an interest superior to the transferee's interest. 184 In
personal property and fixture transfers, perfection occurs when a simple
contract creditor cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee.'85 Although the definition of perfection
contained in the preference section literally applies only to that section,
it is the standard for perfection throughout both the Bankruptcy Code and
U.C.C. Article Nine.
The Kentucky statutes creating the employees' lien impose no
perfection requirements." 6 The courts interpreting those statutes have
uniformly held that no such requirements exist. 87 Therefore, to assert
that the employees' lien is perfected, one must argue that it is perfected
without any action on the part of the holder of the lien: an instance of
automatic perfection. 8 Does the Kentucky employee's lien reach the
status of perfection? Heeding the definition of perfection,"8 9 that
question produces two further questions. Is the employees' lien superior
to the interest of a judicial lien creditor? Is it superior to a bona fide
purchaser of real property? If the employees' lien is superior to each such
entity, it is perfected. 9 For now, the question of the superiority of the
employee's lien to a bona fide purchaser of real property shall be
postponed. 9' Instead, the superiority of the lien against a judicial lien
shall be discussed.
An employees' lien is superior to the holder of a judicial lien. 92
Section 376.160 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that the
employees' lien is "superior to the lien of any mortgage or other
encumbrance created."' 93 A judicial lien is acquired through a prejudg-
ment attachment, a postjudgment seizure, or, in the case of real estate, by
obtaining a final judgment for the recovery of money.194 In these
instances, the lien created is an "encumbrance" on the property of the
'" 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A)(1993).
'. Id. § 547(e)(1)(B).
,16 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.150, .180 (Baldwin 1994).
'
7 See supra note 36.
'88 Automatic perfection is not a new concept. Under Article Nine of the U.C.C.
certain security interests are perfected without the necessity of any postattachment action,
ergo, automatic perfection. See KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-302(l)(c)- (h) (Baldwin
1994).
189 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
'
90 See supra note 34.
"', See infra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.
192 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).
"
9
' Id. (emphasis added).
'94 See id. §§ 425.006-.316, 426.010-.715, .720.
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debtor.'9 5 Pursuant to the statutory provisions, the employees' lien is
superior to such encumbrances.'96 Because the lien is superior to the
encumbrance of a judicial lien, it is "perfected," at least in relation to
personal property and fixtures.'97
It is possible to counter the proposition that the employees' lien is
perfected by focusing on the lien's lack of statutory perfection require-
ments. One could argue that because the statute includes no perfection
requirements the lien cannot be perfected. If it is not perfected, then it is
vulnerable to avoidance by the trustee under § 545(2).9' Such an
argument leads to the other avoidance test of § 545(2): the "enforceable"
test. If the lien "is not ... enforceable at the time of the commencement
of the case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at
the time of the commencement of the case," it is avoidable by the
trustee.' 99 Note that § 545(2) does not require the actual existence of
such a purchaser."' The trustee has the status of a bona fide purchaser
"whether or not such a purchaser exists."' The enforceability of the
lien against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser is judged as of the
commencement of the case.2 °2
The analysis of the employees' lien under the enforceable test also
applies to the previously postponed issue of whether the employees' lien
is "perfected" against a bona fide purchaser of real property under the
"perfected" test.203 Both involve the question of the superiority of the
lien against the bona fide purchaser. In analyzing this question, it is
helpful to substitute "superior" for the statutory word "enforceable. 2 4
If the lien is enforceable against a bona fide purchaser, then the lien is
superior in a conflict between the two entities. Using "superior" more
accurately indicates the focus of the section's test.
The provisions of the Kentucky statutes regarding the employees' lien
are silent regarding the priority between the lien and a bona fide
1
95 fd.19
' Id. § 376.160.
191 The limitation of action provisions of the employees' lien, id. § 376.190, should
have no impact on the perfection question. Those provisions pertain to the time the
employee has to bring an action to enforce the lien, not whether the employee has a lien
superior to a bona fide purchaser or a judicial lien.
198 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1993).
199 Id.200 See supra note 148.
201 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1993).
202 
Id.
203 See supra p. 342.
204 The statutory use of the word "enforceable" is from 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1993).
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purchaser of the liened property. However, one can infer the outcome of such
a conflict by recognizing what the statute does provide. Section 376.160 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes awards the lien superiority over "any mortgage
or other encumbrance."2 5 Thus, the lien is superior to a mortgage. The
Kentucky statutes regarding recording of deeds and mortgages award a
properly recorded mortgage superiority over a bona fide purchaser of real
property.0 6 Because the lien has priority over the mortgage, and the
mortgage has priority over the bona fide purchaser,20 7 the lien should have
priority over the bona fide purchaser. Although no case has directly
considered the issue, a Kentucky case did adopt similar logic in dealing with
the superiority of the employees' lien. In International Harvester Co. v
Dyer's Administrator, the court subordinated a widow's exemption to the
employees' lien.2"' "As a mortgage is inferior to a labor lien under ...
[section] 376.160 [of the Kentucky Revised Statutes], and as the widow's
exemption... is inferior to a mortgage, it follows that her exemption is also
inferior to the labor liens."209
Section 376.180 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes also supports an
inference that the lien is superior to the bona fide purchaser. It provides that
the lien attaches when the company "sell[s] or transfers its business."'21
Thus, the Kentucky legislature recognized that the employees' lien might
arise in the situation in which the business property is sold. Because the lien
attaches in such a case, it is likely that if the legislature intended the lien to
be inferior to the rights of the purchaser of the business, then the statute
would have so provided. The lack of such a provision implies that the lien is
superior, not subordinate, to the purchaser.
The lack of a statutory provision subordinating the lien to a bona fide
purchaser is also important. Compare the statutory provisions of the
employees' lien to the provisions of the mechanics' and materialman's
lien. Section 376.010(2) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that,
in certain situations, the mechanics' and materialman's lien "shall not
take precedence over a ... bona fide conveyance for value."2 ' In such
205 KY. RFV. STAT. ANN. § 376.160 (Baldwin 1994).
2061d. § 382.270. Case law supports the statutes. See, e.g., Hays v. Adams, 294 S.W.
1039, 1041 (Ky. 1927) (holding that purchasers take subject to recorded mortgage);
Morrison v. Hampton's Adm'r, 49 S.W. 781, 782 (Ky. 1899) (holding that vendees take
subject to prior recorded mortgages).207 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.160, 382.270 (Baldwin 1994).
208 178 S.W.2d 966, 969 (Ky. 1944).
2°11d. at 969.
2 1
oKy. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.180 (Baldwin 1994).
211 Id. § 376.010(2).
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a case the lien would not be superior to a bona fide purchaser. This
provision obviously indicates that the Kentucky legislature knows
how to subordinate a statutory lien to a bona fide purchaser.212 Its
failure to do so connotes a decision not to subordinate the employees'
lien.
The lack of a definite statutory pronouncement regarding the priority
of the lien against a bona fide purchaser requires a consideration of the
policy implications of the issue. Because the employees' lien has no
perfection or notice requirements it is vulnerable to being labeled a
"secret lien." The lien is secret because it exists, but third parties are
unaware of it.213 Secret liens generally are not favored in the law
because when such a lien is effective, the rights of an unsuspecting third
party are subordinate to the rights of the lienholder.214 The few pro-
nouncements by the Kentucky courts regarding secret liens can be traced
to an 1877 case.
In Greer v. Church & Co., the court adjudicated the parties' rights to
a piano.215 Church & Co. entered into an agreement with Martin to rent
Martin a piano."16 The agreement also provided Martin with an option
to purchase the piano.2" 7 Before all the rentals had been paid, Martin
sold the piano to Greer, who had no notice of the lease.2" 8 When the
rentals remained unpaid, Church & Co. brought suit to regain possession
of the piano." 9 The court found that the lease transaction was in fact
a sale, and the effect of the agreement gave Church & Co. a lien for the
unpaid purchase price.22 Thus, the conflict over the piano was between
a lienholder and a purchaser without notice of the lien. In holding for the
purchaser, the court discussed the effect of the lien: "The well-defined
policy of the law is to have as few secret liens and claims upon property
as possible, that the title may be readily and safely transmitted from one
to another. This is in the interest of trade as well as opposed to fraud and
collusion.""22 Because the lien could have been registered, which would
have protected both parties, the court refused to allow Church & Co. to
212 See id. §§ 376.440, .450.
213 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (6th ed. 1990).
214 See infra note 227.
215 76 Ky. 430, 431 (13 Bush 1877).
216 Id. at 431-32.
2 17 rd.
211 Id. at 433.
219d.
22o Id. at 434.
221 Id. at 434-35.
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obtain possession of the piano.22 2 The court found no hardship in
requiring compliance with the law or sufferance of its consequences.223
Based on the Greer opinion, one can argue that Kentucky courts do
not tolerate secret liens. The employees' lien is a secret lien in the sense
that no perfection or notice provisions are required. If the Kentucky
courts would strike down the lien based on a policy against enforcement
of secret liens, then the employees' lien would not be enforceable against
a bona fide purchaser for value. If the lien is not so enforceable, it can
be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy.
However, judicially noted policy supports the employees' lien. In
Turner v Randolph, the court determined the priority between the
Kentucky employees' lien and a vendor's lien which encumbered the
employer's property.224 In upholding the superiority of the employees'
lien, the court discussed the policy behind the statute:
The statute is based upon a well-recognizedpolicy, which is written into
the statutes of many states and of the federal government,... to protect
the wage earner in many forms of public endeavor who is necessarily
dependent upon his daily labor for the sustenance and the support of
himself and family, and particularly in such forms as are recognized to
be primarily for the benefit of the public good. Obviously, if the
average day laborer can be deprived, by the misfortune of his employer,
of his wages for the last six months prior to such misfortune, his family
will almost of necessity suffer, and he himself, in many instances,
deprived of the necessities of life, and thereby rendered unfit to give
further service to the public.22
The policy against secret liens competes with the policy favoring
employee liens. Is one stronger than the other? The secret lien pronounce-
ment in Greer arises from a situation in which the lien in question could
have been recorded.226 The other Kentucky opinions discussing secret
liens also involve liens that could have been recorded.227 The employ-
222 Id. at 435.
223 id.
22 280 S.W. 462 (Ky. 1926).
22'Id. at 463.
226 Greer, 76 Ky. at 435.
227 Johnson v. Stimpson Computing Scale Co. (In re Duker Ave. Meat Mkt.), 2 F.2d
699, 701 (6th Cir. 1924) (construing statute as against "evil" secret liens); In re Draughn
& Steele Motor Co., 49 F.2d 636, 636 (E.D. Ky. 1931) (construing an unrecorded trust
receipt as a mortgage within the recording statute), affdsub nom. Commercial Inv. Trust
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ees' lien statutes create no perfection provisions, and no notice provi-
sions. Accordingly, the policy statements relating to secret liens arguably
are not applicable to liens without perfection procedures. It is also
arguable that buyer from the employer of the unpaid employee is on
notice that the employer undoubtedly has employees. Presumably, the
buyer is on notice that employees provide their services for pay. It then
follows that the buyer is on notice that some mechanism for payment
must exist if the employer is not paying the employees their wages. Few
secret liens deserve enforcement. However, the policy for enforcing the
employees' lien against a bona fide purchaser outweighs the policy that
invalidates secret liens.
The grounds for finding the lien superior to a bona fide purchaser
outweigh the grounds for subordinating it. Extrapolation and inference
from the statute, the statute's lack of subordinating words, and the policy
of the statute all lead to the determination that the lien is superior to a
bona fide purchaser. A lien that is superior to a bona fide purchaser is
also enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. Furthermore, an enforce-
able lien is also a perfected lien. Accordingly, under either avoidance test
of § 545(2), the trustee is unable to avoid the employees' lien.
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky employees' lien can play a significant role in insuring
that unpaid employees receive the amounts due them. Pursuant to its
statutory provisions, it is superior to other encumbrances. Because the
priority provisions of Article Nine of the U.C.C. should not apply to a
nonpossessory statutory lien, the employees' lien should also be superior
to the Article Nine security interest.
The effect of the lien will be felt even when the employer has filed
a petition in bankruptcy. Notwithstanding its status as a statutory lien,
unless the lien arises from an event specified in § 545(1) of Title 11 of
the United States Code, it should not be avoidable by the trustee under
§ 545. It is time to revive the employees' lien.
Corp. v. Wilson, 58 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1932); In re Frost, 9 F.2d 128, 129 (E.D. Ky.
1925) (construing an unrecorded mortgage on three automobiles).
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